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Torts-STRICT LIABILITY-DOG OWNERS VIRTUAL INSURERS FOR ANY
DAMAGE CAUSED BY THEIR DOGS-Mapoles v. Mapoles, 350 So. 2d
1137 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
The imposition of strict liability on owners of animals is founded
on the belief that the owner should bear any loss caused by the
animal even if the owner is not personally at fault.' Due to the
harshness of this rule, a dog owner's liability is usually limited
judicially to those consequences which result from some particular
canine characteristic. 2 Such a limitation seems logical since it is the
presence of the dog that creates the potential risk which in turn
gives rise to the application of strict liability. In October, 1977,
however, the Florida First District Court of Appeal in Mapoles v.
Mapoles3 radically departed from this tradition and vastly ex-
tended the liability of dog owners.
On December 3, 1971, Tim Astin and his girlfriend, Cam Ma-
poles, drove Tim's Volkswagen to her brother's home to pick up
Cam's St. Bernard dog. Tim had placed a loaded shotgun in the
backseat of his car earlier that morning after returning from a hunt-
ing trip, but Cam did not know the gun was there. Arriving at her
brother's home, Cam called for the 175 pound dog, and Tim put him
in the backseat with the shotgun. The gun discharged a few seconds
later. A piece of metal torn from the side of the Volkswagen by the
explosion struck Clayton Mapoles, III, a minor, who was standing
nearby. The minor, who was the nephew of Cam Mapoles, was
severely injured around the eye.4
The injured party and his father sued Cam Mapoles and her
insurer, Auto-Owners Insurance Company, for negligence. The trial
court entered an order granting plaintiffs' motion for partial sum-
mary judgment as to liability, and the defendants took an interlocu-
tory appeal.' The First District Court of Appeal, in reversing the
partial summary judgment as to liability, remanded the case to the
trial court' to render final judgment based on the applicability of
section 767.01, Florida Statutes.7 On remand, the trial court entered
a partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs on the issue of liabil-
ity, reasoning that section 767.01 imposed strict liability on the dog
1. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 75, at 492-94 (4th ed. 1971).
2. See text accompanying notes 37-41 infra.
3. 350 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977).
4. Brief of Appellants at 1-4.
5. Fla. App. Rule 4.2a (current version at FtA. R. App. P. 9.130(a)).
6. Mapoles v. Mapoles, 332 So. 2d 373 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1976).
7. (1977). Section 767.01 provides: "Owners of dogs shall be liable for any damage done
by their dogs to sheep or other domestic animals or livestock, or to persons."
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owner under the facts of the case. The defendants then took a sec-
ond interlocutory appeal. The First District Court of Appeal af-
firmed, Judge Robert Smith dissenting.8
Historically, if a person kept a dog known by him to be vicious
and that dog subsequently bit a person, the owner was held liable.
Conversely, if the owner lacked knowledge of the vicious tendencies
of the dog and the dog bit a person, the owner was not held liable.'
Thus, it was always necessary to prove the owner's scienter in order
to recover for injuries caused by a dog.'"
Proof that the owner had actual notice that his dog had previously
bitten someone was not necessary to prove scienter. The owner's
knowledge of the dangerous tendencies of the animal was sufficient.
Liability was based solely on the theory that it was a nuisance to
keep a dangerous animal, and no negligence in the manner of keep-
ing was required."
Disagreement arose, however, as to which defenses were allowed
under the common law. Most courts allowed the defense of contribu-
tory negligence, but others held that this defense did not bar recov-
ery. In those jurisdictions which did allow contributory negligence
as a defense, the term actually denoted an assumption of risk rather
than want of ordinary care as it is usually understood in the law.,2
Most courts also held that posting a warning sign was generally
insufficient to enable the owner of a ferocious dog to escape liabil-
ity." If the injured person was engaged in the commission of a crimi-
nal act or tort, on the other hand, he was not allowed to recover for
any injuries caused by the dog. 4
Many legislatures have enacted statutes modifying or abrogating
the common law scheme of dog owner's liability. A prevalent feature
of such statutes is the easing of the unduly restrictive common law
requirement of scienter,15 as it is often difficult and at times impos-
8. 350 So. 2d at 1138-39.
9. See Houk, Torts: Dog Owner's Liability in Florida, 3 U. FLA. L. REV. 98 (1950). For an
interesting historical perspective see generally Jackson, Liability for Animals in Roman
Law-An Historical Sketch, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 122 (1978).
10. W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 76, at 501. "Scienter" refers to special notice of the
character of the particular animal. Traditionally, notice must extend to the trait or propen-
sity which has caused the damage.
11. See Houk, supra note 8, at 99.
12. Id. at 101.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 103.
15. ALA. CODE tit. 3, § 3-6-1 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 24-521 (1956); CAL. CIv. CODE
§ 3342 (West 1970); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-357 (West 1958); IND. CODE ANN. § 15-5-12-
1 (Burns 1971); IOWA CODE ANN. § 351-28 (West 1946); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 155
(West 1958); MIcH CoMp. LAWS § 287.351 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 347.22 (West 1945);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 17-409 (1947); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 4:19-16 (West 1937); OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 955.28 (Page 1953): OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4. § 42.1 (West 1910); R.I. GEN. LAWS
1979] CASE COMMENTS
sible to prove. Many of these so-called "dog bite" statutes have
eliminated this requirement on the part of the dog owner and re-
placed it with a standard of strict liability.' "
Other such statutes fail to provide expressly for retention of any
of the common law defenses described above. 7 Still others limit the
defenses available to the dog owner to intentional provocation of the
dog by the injured party, 8 by the injured party's tortious conduct, 9
or by both. 0 Generally speaking, recovery is allowed on the basis
that the defendant owned the dog and that the dog caused the injury
to the plaintiff.2'
In 1881 Florida enacted its first dog bite statute which held that
dog owners were responsible for stock killed or maimed by their
dogs. The single reported case which arose under this statute was
§ 4-13-16 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-101 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 18-1-1 (1953); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 16.08.040 (1961); W. VA. CODE § 19-20-13 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 174.02
(West 1957). See generally Note, Dog Owners' Liability: Statutory Effects, 1960 DUKE L.J.
146; Note, Dog Owner's Statutory Liability in North Carolina, 45 N.C.L. REV. 1118 (1967).
16. See Dog Owners' Liability: Statutory Effects, supra note 15, at 147.
17. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3342 (West 1970); NEB. REv. STAT. § 54-601 (1943); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 4-13-16 (1956); TENN. CODE ANN. § 44-101 (1956); UTAH CODE ANN. § 18-1-1 (1953); W. VA.
CODE § 19-20-13 (1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 174.02 (West 1957).
18. ALA. CODE tit. 3, § 3-6-1 (1975); ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 24-521 (1956); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 15-5-12-1 (Burns 1971); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 287.351 (1948); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 347.22
(West 1945); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 17-409 (1947).
19. IOWA CODE ANN. § 351-28 (West 1946); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 466.20 (1968); N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 4:19-16 (West 1937).
20. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22-357 (West 1958); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 140, § 155
(West 1958); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 995.28 (Page 1953); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 4, § 42.1 (West
1910).
21. See generally Dog Owners' Liability: Statutory Effects, supra note 15.
22. Ch. 3294, § 1, 1881 Fla. Laws 94 (current version at FLA. STAT. § 767.01 (1977)).
In Wendland v. Akers, 356 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978), the court noted some
of the early modifications -to this statute:
It is interesting to observe, however, the historical background of this statute. As
originally enacted in 1881, the wording was:
"That all owners of dogs shall be held liable and responsible for damages
to sheep or other stock killed or maimed by their dogs." Chapter 3294, Laws
of Florida (1881).
Thus, damage to persons was not included. But in the 1892 Compilation, Section
2341 provided:
"Owners of dogs shall be held liable for damages to persons and stock
killed or injured by their dogs." (Emphasis supplied.)
We find no legislative enactment to include damages to persons within the scope
of the statute.
Later, in 1901, the legislature enacted Chapter 4979, Laws of Florida (1901),
which provided:
"When any dog or dogs shall kill or in any way damage sheep or other
domestic animals in this State, the owner of such dog or dogs shall be liable
upon the action for damages to the owner of such sheep and other domestic
animals for the damage committed upon the same by such dogs."
But in the next Compilation in 1906, Section 3142 provided:
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Ferguson v. Gangwer" in 1939. Defendant in that case appealed to
the Florida Supreme Court, contending that the plaintiff's plead-
ings were fatally defective in that they failed to allege that the
defendant's dog was vicious or that the defendant had knowledge
of the dog's vicious propensities. The court held that such allega-
tions were not necessary since the statute provided that dog owners
would be responsible for any damage "done by" their dogs. Thus,
the court's interpretation of this statute effectively eliminated the
common law requirement of scienter.
In 1949, the legislature enacted section 767.04 of the Florida Stat-
utes.24 Although this section was said to have impliedly repealed
section 767.01,25 the Florida Supreme Court later decided that the
two statutes were not inconsistent since section 767.04 imposes lia-
bility on the dog owner when the dog bites a person, while section
767.01 imposes liability for any damage caused by the dog. 2
Section 767.04 creates liability when the injured person is either
on public property or is lawfully upon private property. The statute
recognizes two defenses: (1) provocation of the dog by the plaintiff
and (2) the display by the dog owner, in a prominent place on his
premises, of an easily readable sign containing the words "Bad
Dog." The Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
"Owners of dogs shall be liable for any damage done by their dogs to sheep
or other domestic animals or live stock, or to person." (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus once again the compiler placed words in the Compilation which were not there
when the act was adopted by the legislature. Although the validity of Section
767.01, Florida Statutes (1975), cannot now be questioned because of the rules
relating to statutory re-enactments, Section 767.01 should be given a restrictive
scope because the legislature never specifically included damage to persons within
the purview of the statute, at the time of the enactment of these laws.
!d. at 369-70.
23. 192 So. 196 (Fla. 1939).
24. (1977). Section 767.04 provides:
The owners of any dog which shall bite any person, while such person is on or in
a public place, or lawfully on or in a private place, including the property of the
owner of such dogs, shall be liable for such damages as may be suffered by persons
bitten, regardless of the former viciousness of such dog or the owners' knowledge of
such viciousness. A person is lawfully upon private property of such owner within
the meaning of this act when he is on such property in the performance of any duty
imposed upon him by the laws of this state or by the laws or postal regulations of
the United States, or when he is on such property upon invitation, expressed or
implied, of the owner thereof; provided, however, no owner of any dog shall be
liable for any damages to any person or his property when such person shall mis-
chievously or carelessly provoke or aggravate the dog inflicting such damage; nor
shall any such owner be so liable if at the time of any such injury he has displayed
in a prominent place on his premises a sign easily readable including the words
"Bad Dog."
25. Romfh v. Berman, 56 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1952).
26. Sweet v. Josephson, 173 So. 2d 444 (Fla. 1965).
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section 767.04 in 1970.27
Under sections 767.01 and 767.04 the plaintiff need prove neither
the viciousness of the dog nor scienter. 21 The defendant, however,
must actually own the dog for either statute to apply.9 Section
767.01 makes the obligation of the dog owner virtually that of an
insurer for damage done by his dog, whether caused by biting or
otherwise." Similarly, section 767.04 imposes absolute liability on
the dog owner for any damage suffered by persons bitten by the dog
in situations covered by the statute3' so long as the exculpatory
provisions are not applicable.32
As imposed by these statutes, liability of a dog owner is based on
an obligation as insurer rather than on negligence. 31 Consequently,
contributory negligence is no defense to a suit which seeks to hold
an owner statutorily liable.34 The defenses of assumption of risk 35
27. Carroll v. Moxley, 241 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1970).
28. Carroll v. Moxley, 241 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1970); Ferguson v. Gangwer, 192 So. 196 (Fla.
1939); Josephson v. Sweet, 173 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
29. Reid v. Nelson, 154 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1946); Smith v. Allison, 332 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Christie v. Anchorage Yacht Haven, Inc., 287 So. 2d 359 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1973). The court in Smith stated: "Because of the severe, potential consequences
inherent in the statute, there is a clear burden on a plaintiff to show the defendant's actual
ownership of the dog in question, and not merely to show possession or custody." 332 So. 2d
at 634.
30. Mapoles v. Mapoles, 350 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Smith v. Allison,
332 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Scott v. Gordon, 321 So. 2d 619 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1975); Hall v. Ricardo, 297 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); English v.
Seachord, 243 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Josephson v. Sweet, 173 So. 2d 463
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
31. Carroll v. Moxley, 241 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1970); Romfh v. Berman, 56 So. 2d 127 (Fla.
1952); Paskel v. Higgins, 337 So. 2d 416 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Hall v. Ricardo, 297
So. 2d 849 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Minisall v. Krysiak, 242 So. 2d 756 (Fla. 4th Dist.
Ct. App. 1971); Josephson v. Sweet, 173 So. 2d 463 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964).
32. Carroll v. Moxley, 241 So. 2d 681 (Fla. 1970); Knight v. Burghduff, 102 So. 2d 617
(Fla. 1958); Romfh v. Berman, 56 So. 2d 127 (Fla. 1952); Paskel v. Higgins, 337 So. 2d 416
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Harris v. Moriconi, 331 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1976); Hall v. Ricardo, 297 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Minisall v. Krysiak, 242
So. 2d 756 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971).
33. Reid v. Nelson, 154 F.2d 724 (5th Cir. 1946); Carroll v. Moxley, 241 So. 2d 681 (Fla.
1970); Mapoles v. Mapoles, 350 So. 2d 1137 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Allstate Ins. Co.
v. Greenstein, 308 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Knapp v. Ball, 175 So. 2d 808
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Vandercar v. David, 96 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1957).
34. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Greenstein, 308 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); English
v. Seachord, 243 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Knapp v. Ball, 175 So. 2d 808
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Vandercar v. David, 96 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1957);
cf. Hoffman v. ,Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973) (the doctrine of contributory negligence was
discarded in favor of the comparative negligence doctrine as the law applicable in negligence
actions).
35. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Greenstein, 308 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Sand v.
Gold. 301 So. 2d 828 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Hall v. Ricardo, 297 So. 2d 849 (Fla. 3d
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and proximate causation, 3 however, are recognized by the courts.
Despite these general rules, recent cases, dealing with situations
in which the dog has not acted aggressively, are in conflict over the
question of when the dog's actions should be considered an affirma-
tive act for which the dog owner can be held liable under section
767.01. The issue of whether the dog's actions constitute an affirma-
tive act relates to the rationale for the traditional limitation of strict
liability. If the policy justification for imposing strict liability is that
the owner, rather than the public, should bear the loss for damage
"done by" his dog, then forcing the owner to pay for consequences
not directly attributable to any canine characteristic offends tradi-
tional notions of justice.
In Rutland v. Biel, 3 a 76-year-old woman sought recovery for
injuries sustained when she tripped over the defendant's dog. The
Second District Court of Appeal, noting that in previous cases aris-
ing under section 767.01 the dog had acted aggressively, 3 held that
the statute did not apply to situations in which the dog took no
affirmative or aggressive action toward the injured party. 9
In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Greenstein,4 the Third District Court
of Appeal agreed with the basic reasoning of Rutland but it greatly
Dist. Ct. App. 1974); English v. Seachord, 243 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971);
Knapp v. Ball, 175 So. 2d 808 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Vandercar v. David, 96 So. 2d
227 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1957); cf. Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977)
("assumption of risk" merged into comparative negligence).
In Blackburn, the court held that a defendant who raises "assumption of risk" as a defense
will only be able to have the plaintiff's recovery reduced on a percentage of fault basis, the
only exception being when the plaintiff assumes the risk of injury in writing or by actual
consent. See generally Werrenrath III, Comparative Negligence, 1977 COMPARATIVE NEGLI-
GENCE AND CONTRIUION IN FLORIDA 1.
36. Smith v. Allison, 332 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Scott v. Gordon, 321
So. 2d 619 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Greenstein, 308 So. 2d 561 (Fla.
3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975); Auerbach v. Alto, 281 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1973);
English v. Seachord, 243 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Brandeis v. Felcher, 211
So. 2d 606 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App, 1968).
Brandeis held that under § 767.01, the damage must be "done by" the dog. This issue of
causation was determined quantitatively-whether the animal's conduct was "a material,
appreciative, or substantial factor in producing the plaintiff's injuries." 211 So. 2d at 607.
37. 277 So. 2d 807 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1973).
38. Christie v. Anchorage Yacht Haven, Inc., 287 So. 2d 859 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1973)
(German Shepherd lunged at bicyclist); Auerbach v. Alto, 281 So. 2d 567 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct.
App. 1973) (dog ran into the street and began biting a motorcyclist's shoe); Brandeis v.
Felcher, 211 So. 2d 606 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (child frightened by dog jumping against
the fence ran into the street and was struck by a car); Josephson v. Sweet, 173 So. 2d 463
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (dog knocked plaintiff to the pavement); Vandercar v. David,
96 So. 2d 227 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1957) (dog's playful conduct caused plaintiff to fall).
39. 277 So. 2d at 809; cf. English v. Seachord, 243 So. 2d 193 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1971)
(liability for non-bite damages suffered in attack by dog is within contemplation of §
767.01). In English the plaintiff reinjured his back jumping onto a car for safety when the
dog growled and came up to the car's edge. Although the dog did not directly injure the
plaintiff, the injury was the result of the canine characteristic of chasing and attacking.
40. 308 So. 2d 561 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1975).
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extended previous notions of what constitutes an affirmative act.
The defendant's dog in Allstate ran into a street after escaping from
the front yard where he had been chained. When the plaintiff
swerved his car to avoid hitting the dog, he lost control of his vehicle
and collided with a utility pole. The court found that the dog had
acted affirmatively to cause the plaintiff's injuries and held the dog
owner liable under section 767.01.1'
One year after Allstate, the opposite result, under an almost
identical set of facts, was reached in Smith v. Allison.4" Although
the Smith court did not specifically decide whether the dog had
acted affirmatively, it cited Rutland for the proposition that section
767.01 applies only when the dog has taken some affirmative or
aggressive action. 3 The court stated:
We view the application of the statute in the present case as impro-
per in that the words "damage done by their dogs to sheep or other
domestic animals or livestock, or to persons" does [sic] not in-
clude cases where the dog does not itself inflict any damage.
Where, as in the present case, the damage results from some physi-
cal agency set in motion by a chain of events which may have been
triggered by the presence of the dog, absolute liability should not
be imposed."
Thus the court rejected the argument that section 767.01 imposes
absolute liability in every case where the actions of the dog are a
factor in the plaintiff's ultimate injury. Instead, the court held that
there must be a limit to the rule of absolute liability, and that this
case exceeded that limit.4 5 The court also noted that the statute
required proof of the defendant's actual ownership of the dog in
question and that, in this case, the plaintiff had failed to meet his
burden of proof.4"
The First District Court of Appeal addressed the issue of what
constitutes an affirmative act under section 767.01 for the first time
in Mapoles v. Mapoles.47 Citing neither Rutland v. Biel nor Smith
41. Id. at 563.
42. 332 So. 2d 631 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1976). The plaintiff brought action seeking
recovery for damages suffered after he lost control of his motorcycle when the defendant's dog
ran into the plaintiff's path of travel on the roadway. Perhaps one factor which distinguishes
Smith from Allstate is the size of the dogs involved (a small dog in Smith as opposed to a
Great Dane in Allstate). Also, in Smith the plaintiff saw the dog from "some distance away"
and perhaps could have taken some action to prevent the mishap, while in Allstate the dog
"dashed" in front of the car.
43. 332 So. 2d at 634.
44. Id. at 633-34.
45. Id. at 633.
46. Id. at 634.
47. 350 So. 2d 1137.
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v. Allison, the court relied on Allstate Insurance Co. v. Greenstein.
It labeled the actions of Cam's St. Bernard and the act of the dog
which ran into the street in Allstate as affirmative acts for which
the dog owner is liable under section 767.01.21 The court reasoned
that if the defendant was the owner of the dog, and damage was
caused to a person by the dog, then the owner should be liable for
the damage done. 9
The decision in Mapoles is irreconcilable with Rutland and
Smith. In Rutland, the dog's yelp startled the old woman causing
her to trip over the dog and fall. The court found the dog owner not
liable under section 767.01 because the dog had not committed an
affirmative or aggressive act. ' " Since barking is certainly a canine
characteristic, the startling yelp of a dog seems more within the
contemplation of section 767.01 than the behavior of the dog in
Mapoles. Yet the Rutland court held that the statute did not apply.
Thus, under the Rutland rule, there is no support for the proposi-
tion that the dog in Mapoles acted either aggressively or affirma-
tively. The dog owner's boyfriend placed the Saint Bernard dog onto
the rear seat of the Volkswagen. Although the court concluded that
the dog and shotgun became entangled, resulting in the discharge
of the shotgun, precisely what caused the gun to fire was not known.
It could well have been merely the dog's weight or some movement
caused by the activity of putting him into the car. The record con-
tained no evidence to the contrary. Applicability of section 767.01
under these circumstances is questionable since placing any heavy
object in the backseat might have produced similar results.
The holding in Mapoles is also in direct conflict with the Smith
rationale. The court in Smith stated that the cases authorizing the
imposition of liability under section 767.01 require that the act of
the dog, while possibly short of an attack, at least be a direct cause
of the injury." The court disagreed, however, with the notion that
section 767.01 could impose liability in every case where the actions
of the dog were a factor in the plaintiff's ultimate injury.52 Instead,
it interpreted the statute as requiring that the dog itself inflict the
damage, rather than merely trigger a chain of events which would
ultimately produce an injury.5 3
The Mapoles court's mechanical application of section 767.01 ig-
nored those judicial limitations developed in Rutland and Smith.
48. Id. at 1138.
49. Id.
50. 277 So. 2d at 809.
51. 332 So. 2d at 633.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 633-34.
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Furthermore, that court ignored the underlying intent of this stat-
ute-to protect an agrarian society.54 Today imposing strict liability
under the formula expressed in Mapoles could stimulate considera-
ble litigation and confusion. There are a great many dogs in Florida
and they could be involved in a host of situations which could result
in liability for their owners.
Judge Smith suggested a more reasonable approach to the imposi-
tion of strict liability under section 767.01. In his dissent in Mapoles,
he pointed out that nothing in the case indicated that the shotgun
was fired as a result of the canine characteristics for which the
legislature had intended to make the dog owner an insurer.15 "I had
understood," Judge Smith explained, "that strict liability has been
confined to consequences which lie within the extraordinary risk
whose existence calls for such special reponsibility . . . Strict lia-
bility for dog biting, barking, chasing, jumping, vicious or rambunc-
tious conduct, yes. For passive movement which discharges a shot-
gun, no.'',
Judge Smith's statement is consistent with the limitations tradi-
tionally placed on strict liability. Although imposing strict liability
on persons who create a special risk to the community may be
necessary, the courts generally have held that such liability should
be limited to damage directly resulting from the risk created and
should not extend to every harm to which an individual's conduct
may have given rise."
The idea that a person should be held strictly liable for creating
a special risk, even though there is no fault, has generated a great
deal of debate. ' In general, experience has shown that strict liability
is a viable and reasonable alternative to the fault concept in a com-
plex, industrial society.59 Strict liability is particularly well suited
for businesses which can widely distribute losses to customers as
part of the price of their goods or services. 9 However, the notion of
strict liability should be tempered when applied to private individu-
als since they are unable to pass on their losses.
.54. Wendland v. Akers, 356 So. 2d 368, 369 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Smith v.
Allison, 332 So. 2d at 633.
55. 350 So. 2d at 1138.
56. !d. at 1139.
57. See generally W. PROSSER, supra note 1, § 79, at 517; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 509. Comment i at 18 (1977).
58. See generally Sheldon, Return to Anonymous: The Dying Concept of Fault, 25 EMORY
L.J. 163 (1976); Coleman, The Morality of Strict Tort Liability, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 259
(1976); Foster, Some Comments in Favour of the Abolition of Fault Law, 8 AKRON L. REV. 57
(1974).
59. See Sheldon, supra note 58, at 164.
60. Id. at 202.
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Insurance offers a possible solution for these individuals, but it is
not realistic to expect every dog owner to obtain insurance. Indeed,
for most it would be financially impossible. Thus, they would be
personally liable any time their dogs became involved in any set of
circumstances, no matter how bizarre, which resulted in an injury
to another person.
The fact that the injured plaintiff in Mapoles was an innocent
bystander and a minor, and that the defendant was fortunate
enough to be insured, may have influenced the court. The court
probably placed considerable emphasis on the insurance factor, as
it did not even explore the possible negligence of the dog owner's
boyfriend, Tim Astin, in leaving a loaded shotgun in the backseat
of his automobile. Instead, the court opted for imposing strict liabil-
ity under section 767.01, thus guaranteeing recovery for the young
plaintiff who had suffered severe, disfiguring injuries.
Although shifting the financial burden from the innocent plaintiff
is attractive, the court achieved this result at the expense of distort-
ing the applicability of section 767.01. Prior to Mapoles, a dog owner
was considered an insurer of only affirmative or aggressive acts by
the dog. Mapoles effectively eliminates this requirement. In fact,
under Mapoles, the mere presence of the dog may be enough to
invoke the statute.6"
The conflicting district court decisions interpreting what consti-
tutes an affirmative act require that either the Florida Supreme
Court or the state legislature resolve whether section 767.01 should
be limited to situations where the injury results from some canine
characteristic, or whether the statute applies to any situation in
which a dog is involved and a person is injured. Until that decision
is made, the courts should view Mapoles as nothing more than an
anomaly in the case law interpreting section 767.01.
HELO DE LA TORRE
61. .Judge Smith, dissenting in Mapoles, stated: "[The majorityl impose[sl liability
simply because in a general sense the dog's presence caused the shotgun to fire. By this
draconian reading of the statute, the owner is absolutely liable although dogness played no
more a part than if the trigger had been jolted by a cat or a falling sack of groceries." 350 So.
2d at 1138-39.
